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ROLLING JOHN BINGHAM IN HIS GRAVE: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT MAKES SPORT WITH THE 
14TH AMENDMENT 
Stephen E. Gottlieb* 
I.  MULTIPLE 14TH AMENDMENTS 
A.  The Rehnquist Court has created multiple 14th Amendments by 
manipulating strict scrutiny and the internet test. 
The Warren Court organized the concept of strict scrutiny in 
Shelton v. Tucker.1  Where the defendant was obligated to treat people 
without regard to membership in a suspect class and failed to do that, the 
Court would hold them liable for their behavior unless it was done for a 
compelling public reason and there was no less damaging alternative. 
The concept of strict scrutiny had nothing to do with intentions.  
The issue for the Warren Court was whether one party had injured 
another because of a forbidden reason.  That concept of causation was 
understood broadly.  The Court was not looking into people’s minds, 
rather it looked at their behavior.  If the behavior was tied to race, 
religion or other “suspect” categories it was not permissible.  The Court 
drove this point home in Palmer v. Thompson,2 holding that the closing 
of a swimming pool applied to everyone, not just blacks, and that the 
Court was uninterested in the actors’ motivations.3 
                                                                                                                                 
* Steve Gottlieb’s latest book is Morality Imposed: The Rehnquist Court and Liberty in America 
(NYU Press, 2000).  He is on the faculty at Albany Law School, has held endowed chairs for 
distinguished visitors at Akron, Suffolk, Cleveland-Marshall and Marquette schools of law, and has 
also taught at the law schools of St. Louis University and West Virginia University.  Professor 
Gottlieb is a “veteran” of the legal services program, the Peace Corps, and corporate practice in 
New York City.  Educated at Princeton and Yale Law School, he is active on the Board of the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, and a member of the New York Advisory Committee to the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights. 
 1. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
 2. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 3. Id. at 225-27. 
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The Court’s method had little to do with formal neutrality.  The 
Warren Court held in Sherbert v. Verner,4 that rules that had no direct 
relationship to religion but that disadvantaged members of specific faiths 
did not escape legal scrutiny.5  Specifically, the Court held that a 
Sabbath observer did not lose rights to unemployment compensation 
when the employer refused to accommodate the employee’s religious 
need.6 
The reinterpretation began under the Burger Court.  In Police Dep’t 
of Chicago v. Mosley,7 the Court held that neutrality was the touchstone 
of the First Amendment.8  The fundamental problem which the 
Amendment was designed to deal with was government tilting toward 
some speakers and away from others.  As Marshall originally wrote that 
opinion it did not confine the speech clause to that insight but later cases 
peeled away other governmental obligations.9  In Washington v. Davis,10 
the Court rejected Palmer.11  Henceforth, the definition of discrimination 
was malevolent intent. 
Congress fought back in the Civil Rights Act of 199112 and insisted 
that it meant unjustified discriminatory effects.  But discriminatory 
intent stuck as the constitutional standard.  That definition looks like a 
factual judgment.  We have to look at the evidence and decide whether 
some person or entity meant to discriminate.  It is also a convenient 
camouflage.  If it all depends on the facts, and how we interpret them, 
how do you criticize a decision about discrimination? 
II.  SUPREME DISCRIMINATION 
A.  A Fourteenth Amendment for Whites 
Actually it is very simple.  The Court discriminates. 
Despite loud protests that the Court evaluates all equal protection 
cases with the same “skepticism . . . consistency . . . [and] congruence” 
                                                                                                                                 
 4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 5. Id. at 406-07. 
 6. Id. at 408-09. 
 7. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 8. Id. at 99. 
 9. See generally, Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of Neutrality, 51 
ALB. L. REV. 19 (1986). 
 10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 11. Id. at 243-45. 
 12. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).   
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regardless of race or jurisdiction,13 there are separate, distinct and 
unequal Fourteenth Amendments for whites and blacks.14 
White complaints of black advantage are strictly scrutinized.  And, 
in fact, the Court readily draws an inference of discriminatory intent 
against blacks and those who act on their behalf. 
In Shaw v. Reno,15 although the Court noted “the difficulty of 
determining from the face of a single  member districting plan that it 
purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race,”16 the 
Court drew an inference of intent to segregate the races based on the 
district lines.  It held that “redistricting legislation that is so extremely 
irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to 
segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional 
districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification” 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted.17  And it concluded that 
this was an example of the principle that “statutes that, although race 
neutral, are, on their face, ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’” 
and must “be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest” [i.e. “strict scrutiny”].18 
In other words, this was a disparate effects case, except that the 
Court claims to use the effects to measure the intent.  And the effects are 
complex.  The districts do not produce proportional representation—
blacks get less than that.19  The districts are biracial despite the claim of 
segregation.20  And the districts produced effects other than the 
separation of white and black voters—particularly protection of 
                                                                                                                                 
 13. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995).  The Court defined 
skepticism, consistency and congruence: 
First, skepticism: “Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination,”  . . . . Second, consistency: “[T]he standard of 
review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened 
or benefited by a particular classification,” [sic] . . . . And third, congruence: “Equal 
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” [sic] . . . . Taken together, these three propositions lead to the conclusion 
that any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor 
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 14. The argument below expands on a brief discussion in Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers 
on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 351-354 (2002). 
 15. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (holding “political apartheid” unconstitutional). 
 16. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646. 
 17. Id. at 642. 
 18. Id. at 643 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
 19. See id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). 
 20. The Court describes the districts involved as “majority-black districts.”  Id. at 635. 
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incumbents.21  Therefore, the evidence was ambiguous.  The Court was 
willing to take ambiguous evidence and draw the conclusion that 
districters had intentionally discriminated against whites in favor of 
blacks. 
In Miller v. Johnson,22 the Court wrote: 
Although by comparison with other districts the geometric shape of the 
Eleventh District may not seem bizarre on its face, when its shape is 
considered in conjunction with its racial and population densities, the 
story of racial gerrymandering seen by the District Court becomes 
much clearer.23 
The other factor that impressed the Court was the negotiation 
between the State of Georgia and the U.S. Department of Justice under § 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,24 which “requires that the proposed 
change ‘not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.’”25  In effect the 
Court necessarily drew two inferences, first, that the State of Georgia 
had not been discriminating against African-Americans in proposing 
alternative boundaries to which the Attorney General objected, and 
second, that the actual boundaries were “predominantly” motivated by 
race, not by other political objectives.  The inference that Georgia’s 
other proposals were not discriminatory was necessary because only if 
those borders were proper could the Department of Justice’s objections 
and suggestions have been improper.  The Court drew those inferences 
from ambiguous evidence of shape and demographic data. 
Bush v. Vera,26 was another districting case in which the Court saw 
a tension between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights 
Act.  The Court said that it was “a mixed motive suit”27 in which other 
goals, “particularly incumbency protection”28 played a role.  The 
question, therefore, was, which “was the ‘predominant factor’ in the 
drawing of each of the districts?”29  Although other districts displayed 
equally bizarre shapes when examined either descriptively or 
                                                                                                                                 
 21. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996). 
 22. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 23. Id. at 917. 
 24. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000). 
 25. Miller, 515 U.S. at 906 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)). 
 26. Bush, 517 U.S. 952. 
 27. Id. at 959. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 959. 
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mathematically,30 and the involvement of incumbents in shaping the 
districts to their own advantage explained much of the variations in 
shape,31 the Court concluded that race was the predominant factor.  The 
Court looked at the availability to the districts’ designers of precise 
racial data, the shapes of the districts, the districters’ disregard of 
“traditional districting criteria,” and the desire to create majority-
minority districts, and determined that race predominated over 
incumbency protection or other purposes.32  In other words, in Bush, like 
Shaw, the Court inferred from ambiguous information that districters 
intentionally discriminated against whites in favor of blacks. 
Complaints of white behavior are not strictly scrutinized.33  In fact, 
in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,34 the Court refused to permit 
the Attorney General to block a redistricting plan under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965,35 even if it is illegal under Section 2 which 
provides: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color. . . .36 
Sections two and five are written in nearly identical language 
except for the preclearance requirement of Section 5, but the Court 
interpreted Section 5 as applying only to retrogression from prior voting 
plans no matter how discriminatory.37 
B.  A Fourteenth Amendment for Blacks 
The Court draws no inference of intent when blacks have been 
discriminated against, excluded or segregated. 
One very stark decision was in United States v. Armstrong.38  In 
Armstrong, defendants alleged that the prosecutor sent white crack 
defendants back to state courts, but kept black crack defendants in 
                                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 1019 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 963-64, 967, 969. 
 32. Bush, 517 U.S. at 963. 
 33. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (Rehnquist and O’Connor joined the 
decision upholding reapportionment with an 89% deviation among districts). 
 34. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
 37. See Reno, 528 U.S. 320; see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 38. U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
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federal courts where the sentencing disparity was 10-1.39  Justice 
Stevens, dissenting, set out the facts: 
[T]he Government[] . . . submitted a list of more than 3,500 defendants 
who had been charged with federal narcotics violations over the 
previous three years. It also offered the names of 11 nonblack 
defendants whom it had prosecuted for crack offenses. All 11, 
however, were members of other racial or ethnic minorities.  The 
District Court was authorized to draw adverse inferences from the 
Government’s inability to produce a single example of a white 
defendant, especially when the very purpose of its exercise was to 
allay the court’s concerns about the evidence of racially selective 
prosecutions. As another court has said: “Statistics are not, of course, 
the whole answer, but nothing is as emphatic as zero. . . .”40 
Nevertheless, the Court did not draw any inference of 
discrimination, did not remand for further findings of fact, and did not 
permit the district court judge to continue an inquiry which, based upon 
her experience, she thought merited.41  Instead the Court concluded that, 
without discovery, and without permitting discovery, the defendants 
would have to produce similarly situated white defendants.42  In other 
words, no inference of discrimination was available in a situation in 
which only minorities were prosecuted in federal courts for crack related 
offenses. 
In Hernandez v. New York,43 the prosecutor excluded prospective 
jurors because they were bilingual, that is they spoke both English and 
Spanish, from a trial in which many of the witnesses would speak only 
Spanish and, therefore, unlike jurors who spoke no Spanish, bilingual 
jurors would actually be able to understand the witnesses without the 
benefit of a translator.44  I’m sure it seems horrible to imagine jurors 
who can actually understand what the witness is saying.  That is not 
usually a ground for disqualification in other trials.  And it correlated 
very strongly with Hispanic origins.  Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided that it did not look like a pretext and did not raise an 
inference of discrimination in empaneling the jury.45 
                                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 479-81. 
 40. Id. at 482 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 470. 
 42. Id. at 465-66, 469. 
 43. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
 44. Id. at 355-56. 
 45. Id. at 375. 
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In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,46 the Court saw no inference 
of discrimination in a completely segregated workforce in which white, 
Filipino and Alaska Native workers were separately recruited, housed, 
and fed for different jobs in different buildings at the same locations.47  
Stevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun commented in 
dissent that the: 
Evidence included this response in 1971 by a foreman to a college 
student’s inquiry about cannery employment:  “‘We are not in a 
position to take many young fellows to our Bristol Bay canneries as 
they do not have the background for our type of employees. Our 
cannery labor is either Eskimo or Filipino and we do not have the 
facilities to mix others with these groups.’” (citations omitted).48 
Congress fought back with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, insisting 
that the Court change its treatment of discriminatory effects and burdens 
of proof,49 but the Court’s handling of the redistricting and other cases 
discussed above promptly demonstrated the Court’s control over the 
agenda and the findings. 
Despite its claim of skepticism, consistency and congruence, the 
Court draws very different inferences about whites and blacks, 
whitewashing one and tarring the other.  Indeed, the Rehnquist Court’s 
rejection of affirmative action takes on a very different cast in view of its 
treatment of discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.  It 
has indeed been a rejection not just of affirmative action but of black 
claims in almost any guise. 
C.  A Fourteenth Amendment for Other Friends of the Rehnquist Court 
The multiplicity of Fourteenth Amendments in the hands of the 
Rehnquist Court goes further than the black versus white distinction 
obvious in its decisions. 
One of the sharpest turnarounds in the Court’s equal protection 
rules was in Bush v. Gore.50  Although the Court has insisted that 
discrimination is defined by intentions,51 the Court dispensed with intent 
                                                                                                                                 
 46. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 275 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 47. Id. at 647-52. 
 48. Id. at 663 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 49. See Joan Biskupic, “Provisions: The Civil Rights Act of 1991,” CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 
Dec. 7, 1991, at 3620. 
 50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 51. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 558 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 
519 U.S. 102, 135-36 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1001 (1996) 
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for George Bush’s complaint about Florida election procedures. 
And there is no intent test with respect to discriminatory police 
stops.  The Court held in Whren v. United States52 that the subjective 
intent of a policeman or trooper is irrelevant to the legality of a decision 
to stop motorists.53  It drove that point home in Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista54 in which the Court held that the arresting officer’s obvious 
misbehavior was not an extraordinary circumstance which justifies 
calling the arrest into question.55  In Atwater, a policeman arrested a 
young woman for not wearing her seatbelt even though the offense does 
not carry any jail time, even though he nearly stranded several young 
children as he prepared to haul her off and even though the arrest was in 
obvious response to a personal animus against Mrs. Atwater.56  In other 
words, intentional misuse of public power is not a cause for review of 
arrests. 
D.  A Fourteenth Amendment for States 
There is also a separate Fourteenth Amendment for states.  Part of 
the special rules for states involve unwritten exceptions in the rules 
governing states.  The Rehnquist Court insists that rights claimed against 
the state or federal governments have to be explicit, but its rewriting of 
congressional power has been based on the unwritten concept of 
federalism. 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,57 the Court wrote that “[b]road as the 
power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, RFRA [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] 
                                                                                                                                 
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993); Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272, 275 (1993); Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 
684 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 
(1987); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 188 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 552 (1982) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 323 (1980); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 510 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 52. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 53. Id. at 813. 
 54. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 55. Compare id. at 360 (O’Connor, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting), with Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
 56. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24. 
 57. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers 
and the federal balance.”58 
U.S. v. Morrison59 (striking the Violence Against Women Act60 or 
“VAWA”), based on some explanatory language in United States v. 
Lopez61 (striking the Gun Free Schools Act),62 held that only economic 
activity affecting interstate commerce fell within congressional power.  
The two cases relied on the Court’s conception of a federal system in 
which state police powers create an enclave in which the federal 
government may not trench even in the exercise of its federal powers 
and purposes.63  Justice Souter, in dissent, commented that “the majority 
[did not] fail[] to see causal connections in an integrated economic 
world,”64 that is, the impact of violence on interstate economic activity.  
Under traditional doctrine, stemming from the work of John Marshall, 
congressional power extended to the effects of intrastate activity on 
interstate commerce.  The restriction to the effects of economic activity 
was not logically required by the Constitution or prior interpretation. 
“The legitimacy of the Court’s current emphasis on the noncommercial 
nature of regulated activity, then, does not turn on any logic serving the 
text of the Commerce Clause or on the realism of the majority’s view of 
the national economy.”65  But 
in the minds of the majority there is a new animating theory that makes 
categorical formalism seem useful again. . . . It is the instrument by 
which assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of 
preserving a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy 
to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual States see fit.66 
Similarly sovereign immunity is entirely non-textual.  Indeed there 
is good reason to believe that the federal question provision of Article III 
was intended to allow enforcement of federal law against nonconsenting 
                                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 536. 
 59. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 60. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 107-249, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (42 U.S.C. § 13981 was held 
unconstitutional in Morrison). 
 61. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 62. Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2002). 
 63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.  “‘Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of 
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of 
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would 
blur.’”  Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577). 
 64. Id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 645. 
 66. Id. at 644-45. 
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states.67  Moreover, the precise language of the Eleventh Amendment is 
written in such a way that it has no textual implications for federal 
question jurisdiction even while barring diversity jurisdiction in suits 
against a state.  The Court eventually conceded that its sovereign 
immunity and Eleventh Amendment rules were not required by the text 
of the Constitution and resorted to general principles of federalism 
instead.68  Nevertheless, the Court has significantly narrowed federal 
power over the states on the basis of the extra-constitutional rule of 
sovereign immunity which it includes in its equally extra-constitutional 
spirit of federalism. 
Most recently, in Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina 
Ports Authority,69 the Court held that the Federal Maritime Commission 
cannot adjudicate a private party’s complaint against a nonconsenting 
State because of the state’s sovereign immunity.70  In Board of Trustees 
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,71 it held that state employees 
could not sue in federal court for money damages for violation Title I of 
the ADA.72  Alden v. Maine73 held that a state could not be bound by 
federal law even in a suit for money damages in its own courts.74  In 
                                                                                                                                 
 67. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 68. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999).  See also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State 
Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope 
of the States’ sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity.”).  Cf. 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our 
constitutional structure which it confirms”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) 
(same).  In Alden v. Maine, the Court wrote: 
The Eleventh Amendment makes explicit reference to the States’ immunity from suits 
“commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  We have, as a result, sometimes 
referred to the States’ immunity from suit as “Eleventh Amendment immunity.” The 
phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity 
of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, and its history, and the authoritative 
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission 
into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan 
of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments. 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13 (citations omitted). 
 69. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 70. Id. at 1874. 
 71. Bd. Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 72. Id. at 374. 
 73. Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 74. Id. at 712. 
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College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd.,75 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College 
Sav. Bank,76 the Court held that even a claim under the patents and 
copyrights clause of Article I, over which Congress has plenary powers, 
could not be maintained against a state defendant without state waiver,77 
and it held that Congress could not abrogate the defense under its Article 
I power78 nor could the courts infer waiver from state activities governed 
by the patents and copyrights clause.79  In effect the states can decide 
whether to comply free of any enforcement mechanism, subject only to 
the promise that if the situation gets sufficiently serious Congress might 
some day have power to require compliance under the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for violation of rights protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In those ways the Court has carved out a special exception for states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
E.  A Fourteenth Amendment for Business 
There is a Fourteenth Amendment for business.  For example, the 
Court has trouble with too much but not too little damages.  There is no 
indication that the Court has any problem with a cap on damages. 
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,80 the Court discussed at 
length the implication of a constitutional claim for damages for the 
violation of rights: 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. 
Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), we recognized for the first time an 
implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to 
have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.81 
The Court noted that it had limited Bivens to suits against individual 
officers despite the insufficient remedies that would be available to 
Bivens plaintiffs.82  Lack of another remedy was insufficient to justify a 
                                                                                                                                 
 75. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) 
[hereinafter Coll. Sav. Bank]. 
 76. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
[hereinafter Fla. Prepaid Bd.]. 
 77. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75. 
 78. Fla. Prepaid Bd., 527 U.S. at 647-48. 
 79. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-87. 
 80. Corr. Services Corp. v. Makesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 81. Id. at 66. 
 82. Id. at 67-68. 
In the decade following Bivens, we recognized an implied damages remedy under the 
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Bivens action.83  The Court had not extended Bivens since 1979, under 
then Chief Justice Burger.84  The Court noted that it had recently 
concluded that extending a Bivens remedy to the agency involved would 
weaken the aim of targeting the responsible individuals although it 
would help to make plaintiffs whole.85  Bivens had thus been limited to 
                                                                                                                                 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  In both Davis and Carlson, we applied the core 
holding of Bivens, recognizing in limited circumstances a claim for money damages 
against federal officers who abuse their constitutional authority.  In Davis, we inferred a 
new right of action chiefly because the plaintiff lacked any other remedy for the alleged 
constitutional deprivation.  In Carlson, we inferred a right of action against individual 
prison officials where the plaintiff’s only alternative was a Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) claim against the United States.  We reasoned that the threat of suit against the 
United States was insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals.  We also 
found it “crystal clear” that Congress intended the FTCA and Bivens to serve as 
“parallel” and “complementary” sources  of liability. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 68-69.   
In Schweiker v. Chilicky, we declined to infer a damages action against individual 
government employees alleged to have violated due process in their handling of Social 
Security applications. We observed that our “decisions have responded cautiously to 
suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.”  In light of these 
decisions, we noted that “the absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation . . . 
does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money damages 
against the officers responsible for the violation.”  We therefore rejected the claim that a 
Bivens remedy should be implied simply for want of any other means for challenging a 
constitutional deprivation in federal court. It did not matter, for example, that “the 
creation of a Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of relief for injuries that 
must now go unredressed.”  So long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, 
bedrock principles of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new 
substantive liability. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 84. Corr. Services Corp., 534 U.S. at 68.   
Since Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context 
or new category of defendants.  In Bush v. Lucas, we declined to create a Bivens remedy 
against individual Government officials for a First Amendment violation arising in the 
context of federal employment.  Although the plaintiff had no opportunity to fully 
remedy the constitutional violation, we held that administrative review mechanisms 
crafted by Congress provided meaningful redress and thereby foreclosed the need to 
fashion a new, judicially crafted cause of action.  We further recognized Congress’ 
institutional competence in crafting appropriate relief for aggrieved federal employees as 
a “special factor counseling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy.”  We have 
reached a similar result in the military context, even where the defendants were alleged 
to have been civilian personnel. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 69-70.   
Most recently, in FDIC v. Meyer, we unanimously declined an invitation to extend 
Bivens to permit suit against a federal agency, even though the agency—because 
Congress had waived sovereign immunity—was otherwise amenable to suit.  Our 
opinion emphasized that “the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer,” not the agency.  
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the specific facts of the two succeeding Burger Court extensions.86  The 
purpose is individual deterrence, not agency action,87 compensation, or 
discouraging future harms and the Rehnquist Court will not undertake 
those objectives.88 
Failure to provide adequate remedies does not appear to be a 
                                                                                                                                 
We reasoned that if given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal agency instead of an 
individual who could assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.  To the extent 
aggrieved parties had less incentive to bring a damages claim against individuals, “the 
deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”  Accordingly, to allow a Bivens 
claim against federal agencies “would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather 
than its extension.”  We noted further that “special factors” counseled hesitation in light 
of the “potentially enormous financial burden” that agency liability would entail. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 86. Id. at 70.   
From this discussion, it is clear that the claim urged by respondent is fundamentally 
different from anything recognized in Bivens or subsequent cases.  In 30 years of Bivens 
jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise 
nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted 
unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any 
alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct.  
Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to 
extend Bivens, often for reasons that foreclose its extension here. 
Id. 
 87. Corr. Services Corp., 534 U.S. at 70-71.   
The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing 
constitutional violations. Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and liability will 
adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes no matter that they may enjoy 
qualified immunity are indemnified by the employing agency or entity or are acting 
pursuant to an entity’s policy.  Meyer also made clear that the threat of suit against an 
individual’s employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens. . . .  This 
case is, in every meaningful sense, the same. For if a corporate defendant is available for 
suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly 
responsible for the alleged injury.  On the logic of Meyer, inferring a constitutional tort 
remedy against a private entity like CSC is therefore foreclosed. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 71.   
Respondent claims that even under Meyer’s deterrence rationale, implying a suit against 
private corporations acting under color of federal law is still necessary to advance the 
core deterrence purpose of Bivens.  He argues that because corporations respond to 
market pressures and make decisions without regard to constitutional obligations, 
requiring payment for the constitutional harms they commit is the best way to discourage 
future harms.  That may be so, but it has no relevance to Bivens, which is concerned 
solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers.  If deterring the 
conduct of a policy-making entity was the purpose of Bivens, then Meyer would have 
implied a damages remedy against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; it was 
after all an agency policy that led to Meyer’s constitutional deprivation.  But Bivens from 
its inception has been based not on that premise, but on the deterrence of individual 
officers who commit unconstitutional acts. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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constitutional issue.89 
But too much damages is a constitutional issue. 
In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,90 the Court held that the 
Alabama procedure for awarding punitive damages complied with due 
process.91  The jury instructions combined with an opportunity for 
review were sufficient.92  In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,93 the Court 
required judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards or an 
equivalently protective substitute procedure.94  In BMW of North 
America v. Gore,95 the Court held that the amount of the award was so 
grossly excessive that the defendant could not have had fair notice of the 
liability and therefore it violated the Due Process Clause regardless of 
other procedural protections.96  And in Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc.,97 the Court overturned an award of punitive damages 
and required federal courts of appeals to review the constitutionality of 
punitive damage awards de novo rather than by the abuse of discretion 
standard.98 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The argument has focused above on areas in which comparable 
claims have been treated differently depending on the identities of the 
parties and the kinds of parties generally involved in those particular 
cases.  Sometimes the law changes.  Sometimes the burden of proof 
changes.  Sometimes inferences drawn from similar proof reverses.  
Equal protection has been reduced to a mirage.  John Bingham is 
writhing in his grave. 
                                                                                                                                 
 89. Lack of a sufficient damage remedy comes up in a variety of contexts.  See Dooley v. 
Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998) (applying the limitations of the Death on the High Seas 
Act); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (remanding for application of New 
York’s statutory cap on damages); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996) 
(applying the restrictions of the Warsaw Convention).  See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999), Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), and Fla. Prepaid Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (rendering 
a number of federal statutes unenforceable). 
 90. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).; But see id. at 44 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 19. 
 92. Id. at 19-22. 
 93. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
 94. Id. at 431-36. 
 95. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 96. Id. at 585-86. 
 97. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 98. Id. at 431. 
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